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Judicial Intervention in the Arbitral Process:
Mobil Oil Indonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil
(Indonesia) Ltd
The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules regarding arbitration,
severely restrict the scope of judicial review over arbitral awards. 2 In
Mobil OilIndonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indoneszt') Lid 3 the court addressed
the issue of when judicial review of the arbitration process is permitted
under the New York statute. Mobil claimed that the arbitrators exceeded their statutory authority by issuing a prehearing discovery order
and filed suit in the New York courts to have the order overturned. 4 The
New York Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because the discovery order was interlocutory and the statute permitted judicial review only after the arbitrators had rendered a final and
definite award. 5 The holding of the court strongly supports the arbitration statute's policy of protecting the independence of the arbitral forum
from judicial intervention.
In July 1968 Asamera granted Mobil exploration and production
rights for certain petroleum reserves in Sumatra, Indonesia in exchange
for royalty payments. The contract provided that the parties would submit all disputes to arbitration "in accordance with the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce."'6 Subsequently, a dispute over royalty
payments occurred, and in November 1974 Asamera instituted arbitration. At the time the parties entered into the contract and Asamera instituted arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce's 1955 Rules
of arbitration were in effect. 7 However, on June 1, 1975, after arbitration had commenced, a new set of Rules went into effect. 8 Shortly thereafter Asamera filed a request for prehearing discovery, and the
arbitrators had to determine which set of Rules would govern the proceeding because the 1955 Rules did not permit discovery whereas the
1975 Rules granted the arbitrators authority to order discovery. 9

I N.Y. Civ. PRAC.

LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1963).
Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 278 N.E.2d 633, 328 N.Y.S.2d 4.18 (1972).
3 43 N.Y.2d 276, 372 N.E.2d 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d 186, rev'g 56 A.D.2d 339, 392 N.Y.S.2d 614
(1977).
4 Id at 281, 372 N.E.2d at 22, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
5 Id
6 Id at 279, 372 N.E.2d at 22, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
7 INT'L CHAMBER Or COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION (1955).
8 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION (1975).
9 Article 16 of the 1955 Rules provided that "in the event of no provision being made in
2 See
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A majority of two arbitrators construed the arbitration clause to refer "to those Rules as they are from time to time."' 0 Therefore, the majority held that the 1975 Rules applied and ordered discovery. Mobil
immediately appealed to the International Chamber of Commerce Court
of Arbitration to order the arbitrators to apply the 1955 Rules, but the
court refused to interfere with the ruling."1
Mobil then filed a complaint in the New York Supreme Court to
vacate the arbitrators' ruling under CPLR 751112 on the ground that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority by ordering prehearing discovery.
The court vacated the award, holding that "it is for the courts, not the
arbitrators, to determine which procedural rules apply."' 3 On appeal
the Appellate Division found that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the controversy, but reversed on the merits. 14 The Appellate Division
certified the question of jurisdiction to the New York Court of Appeals
which held that section 7511 did not permit judicial review of interlocutory arbitral orders.' 5 Since the court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, it did not reach the merits of Mobil's claim.
The court in Asamera held that the procedure for judicial review was
found exclusively in the New York arbitration statute. 16 That statute
authorizes judicial intervention before arbitral proceedings have commenced and after the delivery of an arbitral award, but prohibits judicial
interference while arbitration is underway. This rule is set forth in three
sections of the statute. First, section 7503 provides for motions to stay or
these Rules, those of the law of procedure chosen by the parties or, failing such choice, those of
the law of the country in which the arbitrator holds the proceedings" shall apply. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, art. 16 (1955).

Since under New York law arbitrators do not have authority to order prehearing discovery,
see De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402, 321 N.E.2d 770, 362 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1974); Katz v.
State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 64 A.D.2d 900, 407 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1978) (mem.); 8 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 7505.06, at 75-128 (1963),
Asamera could not have obtained discovery under the 1955 Rules.
The 1975 Rules, on the other hand, allow the arbitrators to determine the procedural law
they deem appropriate in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Article II provides:

The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator shall be those resulting
from these Rules and, where these Rules are silent, any rules which the parties (or

failing them, the arbitrator) may settle, and whether or not reference is thereby
made to a municipal procedural law to be applied to the arbitration.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, art. 1I (1975).

Thus, under the 1975 Rules, the arbitrators were not bound by the New York law barring
discovery in arbitral proceedings.
10 43 N.Y.2d at 280, 372 N.E.2d at 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 188. A dissenting arbitrator found
that the parties intended the 1955 Rules to apply. Id
I Id.
12 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7511 (b)(1)(iii) (McKinney 1963).
13 56 A.D.2d at 341, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 615.

14 The Appellate Division held that absent a provision to the contrary in the arbitration
agreement, the arbitrators have authority to decide all procedural, evidentiary and substantive

questions. As long as the arbitrators reach a rational result, they do not exceed their authority.
56 A.D.2d at 342, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 616. See a/so note 22 infra.
15 43 N.Y.2d at 281, 372 N.E.2d at 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
16 Id.
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compel arbitration.' 7 These motions occur prior to the commencement
of arbitral proceedings and address the issue of the validity of the agreement providing for arbitration. Second, section 7511(a) states that a
party may move to modify or vacate an award within-ninety days after
the award is delivered.' 8 Third, section 7511(b) provides that a court
shall vacate an award where "an arbitrator, or agency or person making
the award exceeded his power."' 19
The principle that the right to judicial review is found exclusively in
the statute is well established in the case law. 20 However, the right to
judicial review of interlocutory arbitral orders presented an issue of first
impression for the court. Since section 7511 provides for judicial review
only after delivery of an arbitral award, the dispositive issue in Asamera
was how the court defined the word "award" within the context of the
statute. The Court of Appeals construed "award" to mean the final, conclusive determination of all issues submitted for arbitration. 2' By employing this definition, the court adopted the construction which
the independence of the arbifurthered the statutory purpose of ensuring
22
tral forum from judicial interference.
In arriving at its definition of "award" the court relied on the nineteenth century case ofJones v.Welwood.23 In Wewood the parties submitted various disputes arising from contracts for the sale of land to
arbitration. The court held that where the parties had submitted a dispute to arbitration "the award must be co-extensive with the submission,
24
and that it must be a final determination of the matter submitted.
The court's reliance on Welwood to determine what constituted a
final award was proper even though the issue of statutory construction
17 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7503 (McKinney 1963).
18 Id § 7511(a).
19 Id § 751 l(b)(1)(iii).

20 See, e.g., Livingston v. Gindoff Textile Corp., 32 Misc. 2d 258, 223 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup.

Ct. 1961); Cresroad Estates, Inc. v. Tenzer, 194 Misc. 649, 87 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct.
1949).
21 43 N.Y.2d at 281, 372 N.E.2d at 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
22 Id at 282, 372 N.E.2d at 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 188. The courts have interpreted the
substantive parameters of judicial review under section 7511(b)(1)(iii) with the same end in
view. An arbitrator exceeds his power only when he (1) gives a completely irrational construction of a contract, Pavilion Cent. School Dist. v. Pavilion Faculty Ass'n, 51 A.D.2d 119, 380
N.Y.S.2d 387 (1976), (2) acts outside the scope of authority conferred by the contract, Civil
Service Employees Ass'n v. Steuben County, 50 A.D.2d 421, 377 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1976), or (3)
issues an award which violates a statute or a strong public policy, Psychoanalytic Center, Inc. v.
Burns, 62 A.D.2d 963, 404 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1978) (mem.) (arbitrator does not have power to split
fees in violation of statute); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976) (arbitrator does not have power to award punitive damages).
An arbitrator is not bound by substantive rules of law or the rules of evidence, and a court
will not disturb an award because of an error of law or fact, or misconstruction of a contract.
Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41 N.Y.2d 578, 362 N.E.2d 977, 394
N.Y.S.2d 179 (1977). Even where an arbitrator applies substantive law, a court will not vacate
an award because of erroneous application of law. Schine Enterprises, Inc. v. Real Estate Portfolio of N.Y., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 799, 257 N.E.2d 665, 309 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1970) (mer.).
23 71 N.Y. 208 (1877).
24 Id at 212.
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was not involved in that decision. The court's reliance on a pre-statutory
case to define "award" comported with the rules of statutory construction because the New York statute did not specifically define "award"
and the language of section 7511 was drawn heavily from the common
law. 25 In the absence of a statutory definition the court properly turned
to Welwood which set forth the common law standard for a final arbitral
award.2 6 Moreover, the language of the statute provides additional support for the court's conclusion. Section 7511(b) states that an award
shall be vacated where an arbitrator "so imperfectly executed [his power]
that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made."'27 Thus, construing "award" to embrace an interlocutory order would conflict with the statutory requirement that an arbitrator fully
execute his power so as to render a final and definite award.
The Court of Appeals did not discuss the line of cases which the
Appellate Division relied on in finding jurisdiction over the controversy.
The most important case relied on by the Appellate Division, Astoria Medtcal Group v. Health InsurancePlan,2 8 involved a dispute between an insurer
and its physician composed medical groups over fee arrangements. The
insurer in Astoria nominated a physician to the arbitral panel who was
also a member of its Board of Directors and a paid consultant. 29 Several
medical groups moved to disqualify the arbitrator because of bias. The
Appellate Division held that it had jurisdiction over the controversy,
stating:
The absence of statutory authority is not an absolute bar to pre-award
judicial intervention for the purpose of disqualifying an arbitrator....
[1It is inconceivable that a court of equity must sit idly by and permit an
arbitration proceeding to continue where, by reason of the surrounding
circumstances, any award made in favor of one30party is preordained to

be vacated. The courts are not that impotent.

Despite the Astoria court's sweeping language with regard to the ab25 See Matter of Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1901).

Prior to the enactment of the

predecessor of § 7511, the law courts had no jurisdiction to review arbitral awards, and courts of
equity granted relief only on the ground of corruption. The statute granted courts the power to
vacate an award on the grounds of corruption, fraud, misconduct, or where the arbitrators have
exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers. Id at 497, 62 N.E. at 576.
26 43 N.Y.2d at 281, 372 N.E.2d at 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
27 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7511(b) (1) (iii) (McKinney 1963).
28 13 A.D.2d 288, 216 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1961)(per curiam), ret/don other grounds, 11 N.Y.2d
128, 182 N.E.2d 85, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1962). The Appellate Division also cited Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Selly, 295 N.Y. 395, 68 N.E.2d 183 (1946)(per curiam), and Pisciotta v. Newspaper Enterprises, 5 A.D.2d 1014, 174 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1958) (mem.). In Sely a court appointed
the arbitrator in a labor dispute, and the employer moved to remove him because of disqualification and disability. The trial court granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
295 N.Y. at 398, 68 N.E.2d at 183. In Pisci'ota a contract provided for arbitration before three
arbitrators consisting of the two parties and an umpire. One party moved for an order to stay
arbitration. The Appellate Division held that since the parties expected to act as litigants the
umpire would serve as the sole arbitrator. The clause providing for the parties to serve as arbitrators was excised. 5 A.D.2d at 1014, 174 N.Y.2d at 420.
29 13 A.D.2d at 289, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
30 Id. at 289-90, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
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sence of statutory authority for judicial interference in arbitral awards,
the Asamera case is clearly distinguishable on its facts. In Astoria judicial
review occurred before arbitral proceedings commenced, whereas in
Asamera, the trial court attempted to assert jurisdiction over the arbitral
panel during the actual arbitral proceeding. Unlike Asamera, Astoria did
not involve review of an interlocutory arbitral order, but rather a prearbitral review of a party's behavior. 3' As such, Astoria is totally consistent with the New York arbitration statute, which provides for limited
judicial review prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings in
a motion to stay or compel arbitration. Similarly the decision in Asamera
is consistent with the design of the statute. It authorizes limited judicial
review after the completion of arbitral proceedings in a motion to modify
or vacate an award, but does not set out any provision for judicial intervention during the proceeding itself. After weighing the conflicting policy considerations, the Asamera court held that once arbitration
proceedings have commenced the policy of safeguarding the speed and
economy of arbitration outweighs the policy of preventing arbitrators
32
from rendering awards which will later be vacated.
Recent New York cases have reached results consistent with the reasoning of Asamera. In Adelstein v. ThomasJ Manzo, Inc.,33 the Appellate
Division held that an arbitrator who retained jurisdiction to fix the
amount of back pay in the event that the parties could not agree to a
settlement among themselves had not rendered a final award. 34 The
court relied exclusively on Asamera in holding that no appeal was authorized under section 7511.35
In different circumstances, the New York Supreme Court, in Shay v.
746Broadway Corp.,36 held that the policy underlying the arbitration statute did not prohibit judicial intervention. Shay addressed the issue of
whether a court can grant injunctive relief in the period between the
demand for arbitration and the appointment of an arbitrator. In Shay,
31 Sly and Pirciotta are similarly distinguishable. In both cases judicial review occurred

before arbitration proceedings commenced. Consequently, Sely involved review of a decision of
a court, and Piscotua, like Astoria, involved review of an act of a party.
32 43 N.Y.2d at 282-83, 372 N.E.2d at 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
Under the English Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21, the courts can decide legal
questions arising in an arbitration proceeding through a procedure known as the special case.
An arbitrator can present either a question of law in the form of a special case to a court during
the arbitration proceedings, or the final award itself for a review as to its legal correctness. In
the former situation a party can appeal the court's decision only with permission of the rendering or appellate court, whereas in the latter situation an appeal lies as of right. Id The Act
distinguishes between interlocutory appeals and appeals of the final award in order to prevent
unreasonable delays and enable the arbitrator to arrive at a final award in as efficient a manner
as possible. See Note, CommercialArbitration. Expanditg theJudiutjalRole, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1218,
1237 (1968). Although the New York and English statutes create different roles for the courts,
both aim to prevent delay and maintain the speed and economy of arbitration.
33 61 A.D.2d 933, 402 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1978) (mem.).
34 Id
35 Id

36 96 Misc. 2d 346, 409 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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petitioner agreed to convert two buildings into multiple-unit residential
dwellings in exchange for respondent's promise to convey a one-third interest in one of the buildings. A dispute arose over petitioner's performance and the parties submitted the problem to arbitration in accordance
with their agreement. However, petitioner sought an injunction prohibiting respondent from conveying or encumbering the property until an
arbitrator was appointed.3 7 The court found that it had an inherent
power to grant injunctive relief in this period before formal proceedings
could begin and therefore granted the injunction. The court's reasoning
was consonant with Asamera because the purpose of the injunction was to
prevent irreparable harm and preserve the status quo so that arbitration
would be effective. 38 The court asserted that the injunction protected
the integrity of the arbitral forum.
The Asamera court's interpretation of the New York arbitration statute is also consistent with federal court interpretations of the virtually
identical United States Arbitration Act. 39 Under the United States Arbitration Act, the remedy for bias or prejudice of an arbitrator lies exclusively in a motion to vacate the award after it is rendered. 40 The concern
of the federal courts, as with the Asamera court, was the inviolability of
41
the arbitral process.
In light of the well established policy underlying the New York statute, the court in Asamera correctly resolved the issue of judicial review of
interlocutory orders. The holding represents a policy decision to sacrifice
arbitral economy in a few cases of egregious abuse of the arbitrator's
authority in order to prevent minor interlocutory disputes from reaching
the courts and causing an even greater dissipation of arbitral economy.
Since cases of egregious abuse of arbitral authority are relatively rare,
protection of the integrity of the arbitral process requires that judicial
review occur in such cases only after a final award has been rendered.
-- STEVEN

H.

SHOLK

37 Id at 347, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
38 Id at 349, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 71. The Court in Shay did not cite or discuss Asamera. Id
39 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
40 E.g., Marc Rich & Co. v. Transmarine Seaways Corp., 443 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Petition of Dover Steamship Co., 143 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Sections 10-12 of
the Act provide the procedures and grounds for a motion to vacate an arbitral award.
41 See cases cited in note 40 supra.

